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This article engages with linguistic ethnography from the perspective of 
sociological realism. It begins by reviewing some of the positions 
expressed in the linguistic ethnography (LE) literature about the extent to 
which LE is defined by theoretical orientation as well as by method. The 
article is then framed around a kind of ‘generic’ sociolinguistic research 
question - ‘Which people use which kinds of language in what 
circumstances and with what outcome(s)?’. Taking each element in turn, it 
explores the ways in which an ethnographic approach contributes to the 
processes of: classifying speakers as members of various kinds of social 
groups; identifying language varieties; accounting for the influence of 
‘context’ and identifying ‘outcomes’. I suggest that each of these aspects of 
social linguistic research stands to benefit from the methods developed in 
ethnography, and from the theories and principles underlying the 
approaches it uses. However, drawing on the work of contemporary realist 
social theorists, the article concludes that ethnography is a method suited to 
illuminating certain aspects of such questions better than others.  
 




This article suggests that linguistic ethnography is not inevitably linked to 
any one theoretical perspective, and that some of the most fruitful work in 
the field is compatible with the sociological realism developed in recent 
years by a number of theorists, despite relatively little explicit discussion of 
this in the linguistic ethnography literature. Sociological realism is a post-
positivist philosophy, which insists, among other things, on a strong 
emphasis on human agency. Realist approaches recognize both that reality 
has an existence which is independent of how we choose to describe it, and 
that our descriptions are inevitably mediated through discourse. The 
approach entails an analytical separation of structure, culture and agency, 
which each have distinctive properties and powers2. 
In order to explore aspects of the issues raised by the UK Linguistic 
Ethnography Forum (Rampton et all 2004; Rampton, this issue), the 
discussion is framed around a kind of ‘generic’ research question, 
summarised as ‘Which people use which kinds of language in what 
circumstances and with what outcome(s)?’ This is a question attended to in 
sociolinguistic studies of many kinds (and not just the traditional, 
variationist work associated with the pioneers of the discipline). Its 
relevance to the issues at hand may be demonstrated by various linguistic 
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ethnographies, of which the following are just a very few examples; (the 
summaries do not imply the reduction of these studies to nothing more than 
the aspects highlighted). ‘People’ who have been studied include: 
‘Trackton blacks and Roadville whites’ in the Piedmont Carolinas (Heath 
1983: 10); black and white adolescents in ‘Areas A and B’ (Hewitt 1986); 
Chinookans (Hymes 1996); ‘jocks’ and ‘burnouts’ (Eckert 2000); 10–12 
year old school children attending Middle Schools in Southern England 
(Maybin 2005). The ‘kinds of language’ identified and described in these 
linguistic ethnographies include, for example: ‘different ways of using 
language in worship, for social control, and in asserting their sense of 
identity’ (Heath 1983); ‘London Jamaican’; three- and five-pattern 
sequences in narratives; backed /e/ and /uh/ vowels; collaborative verbal 
strategies, stories of personal experience and the reworked voices of others. 
‘Circumstances’ include: a wide range of interactions in Trackton and 
Roadville; mixed peer group interaction; formal and informal storytelling 
settings; social interactions at high school; classroom and social 
interactions in the middle school. ‘Outcomes’ and potential outcomes 
include: mismatches of expectation between children and teachers as the 
children progress through school; complex negotiations of ‘inter-racial 
friendship’; a potential ‘source of encouragement and stimulation’ (Hymes 
1996:140) in schooling; the fulfillment of a number of simultaneous 
individual and social functions. 
These diverse linguistic ethnographies, and many others besides, 
tell us a great deal – in rich and nuanced ways – about social actors and 
their language practices in particular situated activities. 
 
(LINGUISTIC) ETHNOGRAPHY AND THEORY 
Rampton et al (2004) provide an extensive discussion of what the UK 
Forum understands by the term Linguistic Ethnography, and it is not the 
best use of the space available to me to review issues that are covered 
there. However, as a brief preamble to the points below, I want to identify 
an issue that may not have been resolved, and this is the nature of the 
relationship between LE and theory. The practitioners associated with the 
Linguistic Ethnography Forum represent LE as connected to particular 
theories about the nature of the social world and of language. One of the 
anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this article asserted that, 
‘ethnography … is generally understood in (socio-) linguistic ethnography 
as both theory and method’; Blommaert (2005) rejects 'moves' which he 
claims result in a ‘narrowing of ethnography,' such that 'the immense value 
of ethnography as a complex of theory, method, and epistemology is 
overlooked' (p.239 n.). On the other hand, ethnography itself has been 
associated with various theories about the nature of society and how it can 
be understood, including functionalism, Marxism, interactionism, and so 
on (Hammersley, pers. comm.), so that theoretical orientation cannot 
actually be taken as given in the ethnographic approach. Hammersley 
(2006) highlights the lack of consensus about the term ‘ethnography’, 
noting that, ‘[t]he problem is that, like many other methodological terms 
used by social scientists, “ethnography” does not form part of a clear and 
systematic taxonomy’ (p.3, emphasis added). Hymes (1996) opines that 
‘[a]nthropologists do not themselves have a unified conception of 
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ethnography’ (p.3), and points out that, ‘[d]ifferences in analytic point of 
view can take different vantage points within a shared body of data … and 
even prescribe different definitional constructs for master-concepts such as 
the cultural and the social’ (p.11). These continuing debates demonstrate 
that the difficult questions of ontology and epistemology are not resolved 
by adopting an ethnographic – or indeed any other – methodological 
approach. 
Thus analysis of ethnographically generated data will involve 
deploying concepts other than those used by participants themselves, and, 
often, adjudicating between the different descriptions of similar things 
provided by different participants. Some linguistic ethnographers accept 
this either explicitly or implicitly, in their practice, where ‘an independent 
angle on participants’ views is fairly commonplace’ (Rampton, pers. 
comm.). Others, in emphasising  the importance of seeking to ‘understand 
the world as they [the participants in the study] have understood it’, and in 
refraining from questioning ‘whether their interpretation of events was the 
correct or true interpretation’ (Norton 2000: 58), could seem to blur the 
distinction between making sense of data and making knowledge claims. 
Discussion and debate in this area sometimes suggest that academics may 
be contributing to the social inequalities they deplore if they make any 
claims for the authority of their own accounts and interpretations. 
It is well established, of course, that ethnographic researchers, like 
others in the academic community, need reflexivity – an awareness that 
‘the ethnographer himself or herself is a factor in the inquiry’ – but this 
need not be the threat to objectivity that it is often, despairingly, portrayed 
as being: ‘scientific objectivity resides, not in the individual scientist, but in 
the community of scientists’ (Hymes 1996: 13). This point is very similar 
to that made by Popper, whose notion of World 3, ‘the world of the 
products of the human mind,’ includes ‘scientific theories (whether true or 
false), scientific problems, social institutions’ and so on (Popper and Eccles 
1977: 38-39). It is articulated today by social theorists within the realist 
tradition; realism, ‘necessarily a fallibilist philosophy,’ (Sayer 2000: 2) 
‘must acknowledge that the world can only be known under particular 
descriptions, in terms of available discourses, though it does not follow 
from this that no description or explanation is better than any other'. 
Similar points are made by Williams (2005: 99) who observes that: 
Critiques of objectivity find their mark, but the problem with so 
many of these is that they move from the often articulated and 
wholly correct position that objectivity as value freedom is 
untenable, to the incorrect and undesirable position that objectivity 
is impossible; 
 
and Bhaskar: ‘there is no conflict between seeing our scientific views as 
being about objectively given real worlds, and understanding our beliefs 
about them as subject to all kinds of historical and other determinations’ 
(Norris 1999). 
One dimension of the ‘reflexivity’ prioritised by the LEF would add 
to my ‘generic question’ the supplementary questions, ‘Where is this 
question coming from, who wants to know and why, and what are the 
implications for analysis and the afterlife of the research?’ (Rampton, pers. 
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comm.), whereas other ethnographers strongly resist conceptualising 
research in light of such concerns: 
For me, the ethnographer must neither be in the service of some 
political establishment or profession nor an organic intellectual 
seeking to further the interests of marginalised, exploited, or 
dominated groups. Both of these orientations greatly increase the 
danger of systematic bias. 
(Hammersley 2006: 11) 
Thus it is not ethnography per se that situates any given inquiry in a 
particular relation to either values or knowledge. Linguistic ethnography is 
not incompatible with realist precepts, which may in turn (though this is far 
from inevitable) share progressive political ideals. 
Realism can help to uncover issues of power, representation, and 
subjectivity and how discursive and other social practices produce 
real effects. This can help us understand the manner in which (non-
discursive) social structures are reproduced through various forms 
of ideology and discourse. And by knowing this, we can start to 
address questions concerning human emancipation and how the 
world is to be transformed. 
(Joseph and Roberts 2003: 17) 
Realist approaches recognise the social world as existing 
independently from our descriptions of it, and that language, structure and 
agency are different kinds of phenomena in that world, with different kinds 
of properties and powers. As Craib (1998: 63) puts it, ‘people, social 
groups, organizations, and social structures are all different types of object 
which call on different forms of understanding. Nevertheless we have to 
understand each of them in order to understand the others.’ A similar point 
is made by Layder (1998), who is unconvinced by analyses which, for 
example, privilege 'intersubjective relations' as 'exhaustive ontological 
characterizations of the social world' (p.86). '[S]ocial reality,’ he observes, 
‘should not and cannot be understood as a unitary whole which is 
susceptible only to one kind of explanatory principle, theoretical 
assumption, or methodological approach'. Early work in linguistic 
ethnography itself sometimes hints at a stratified ontology, as when 
Gumperz (1982a: 203), for example, identifies a need to distinguish speech 
patterns at an ‘interactive’ level from the level of ‘social rules’ which are ‘a 
function of macro-social or perhaps economic and political forces.’ These, 
he continues, ‘require different methods of analysis. We cannot confuse 
them or simply jump from grammar to one or the other.’ 
Different practitioners of linguistic ethnography may, as Hymes 
says, use different analytical concepts and arrive at different conclusions 
about similar data, but this, I would argue, will be a product of differences 
in their theories about language and the social world. Thus, as Rampton et 
al (2004: 15) acknowledge, ‘concentration on the domain of face-to-face 
interaction may incline researchers to exaggerate the power of human 
agency and to neglect less visible processes of social reproduction’. In the 
remainder of this article, I will seek to illustrate the implications of a realist 
ontology for linguistic ethnographic methodology, using the framework of 
the research question introduced above. 
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‘WHICH PEOPLE?’: SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL 
CATEGORIES 
How does the linguistic ethnographer, or indeed any other social 
researcher, decide which social actors, which speakers, constitute a focus 
for study? Ethnography has long had to come to terms with the 
heterogeneity and complexity of the urban, bureaucratic, industrial contexts 
where much such research is carried out. Nevertheless, the term 
‘ethnographic’ carries in its etymology the notion of an ethnos, a social 
group with significant characteristics in common, so the issue of social 
categories must somehow be addressed by (linguistic) ethnographers. ‘Not 
even an ethnographic approach,’ observes Bucholz (2003: 407), ‘… 
releases the researcher from the responsibility of determining who and 
what will count for the purposes of analysis’. In the linguistic ethnography 
literature with which I am familiar, two trends in responding to this 
question are discernible, though not always fully explicated.  
One emphasises the importance of orienting to participants’ own 
identifications. For example, Rampton et al (2004) set out the principle of 
‘anti-ethnocentricity and relevance’. A study such as Eckert’s (2000, see 
above) demonstrates the productive potential of not allowing the 
assumptions found in ‘prevailing definitions’ and ‘terms that are already 
given’ (Rampton et al 2004) to constrain the lines of inquiry. Eckert’s 
‘burnouts’ are a self-identified category of some of the young people in her 
study, which shows how important insights can emerge when the 
researcher allows for new social groupings to be identified, so that ‘the data 
is allowed to lead the groupings, rather than vice versa’ (Meyerhoff 1994: 
8), and Eckert’s investigation, which is partly about male-female 
differences, soon reveals a distinction between ‘jocks’ and ‘burnouts’ that 
simply could not have been explored using a research design based on a 
priori categories. Likewise, Maybin explains that, although the children 
she studied might appear to have been ‘a fairly homogenous group in terms 
of age, ethnicity, social background and locality,’ she provides ‘an account 
of the diversity of the individual experience of 10–12 year-olds who 
seemed, on the face of it, to come from a very similar social and ethnic 
background’ (2005: 2).  
However, linguistic ethnographers, like all social researchers, 
recognise that even deep immersion in participation and observation of the 
practices of the people being studied will not yield unmediated descriptions 
of their location in different kinds of social relations. Hymes (1996: 9) 
makes clear that ‘members of a community themselves’ may well not ‘have 
an adequate model of it, much less an articulated adequate model.’ This 
leads us, then, to the second possible position on this question, which is 
that the ethnographic method, and the data yielded by it, will need to be 
supplemented by theory - including theories about social categories - 
whose origins lie outside the data. Social categories, that is, are theoretical 
descriptions, and, as Hammersley says, ‘… all descriptions are structured 
by theoretical assumptions: what we include in descriptions is determined 
in part by what we think causes what.’ (1990: 598). 
Linked with a participant-oriented view of social categories is the 
associated concept of social identities, and contemporary research in 
sociolinguistics places a great deal of emphasis on people’s identities as 
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fluid. ‘We recognise [identity] now,’ say the editors of a recent collection 
on the subject (Omoniyi and White 2006), ‘as non-fixed, non-rigid and 
always being co-constructed by individuals of themselves, or by people 
who share certain core values or perceive another group as having such 
values.’ Blommaert (2005: 205) claims similar consensus among the 
research community: 
Almost any significant author in the wide field of identity studies 
would argue that people don’t have an identity, but that identities 
are constructed in practices that produce, enact, or perform identity 
– identity is identification, an outcome of socially conditioned 
semiotic work. 
 
Not all commentators would express the point in quite these terms, 
however, and dangers associated with some versions of this approach are 
articulated by Brubaker and Cooper (2002) and by Todd (2005: 432-33), 
who warns what can happen when ‘[i]dentity becomes plural, identities 
proliferate, varying in each situation where a new aspect of self is 
performed’ The concept then: 
… loses its usefulness for the analysis of social transformations. If 
we think of identity in terms of multiple, free-floating macro-
categories that individuals may choose to emphasize or ignore … 
identity change loses any claim to be a significant part of the causal 
patterning of social change. It becomes no more than interactional 
change, epiphenomenal. 
 
Others, such as Archer (2000, 2003), Layder (1997, 1998) and Craib 
(1998) all propose rather less evanescent versions of identity. As Craib has 
it, ‘[s]ocial identities can come and go but my identity goes on as 
something which unites all the social identities I ever had, have, or will 
have. My identity always overflows, adds to, transforms the social 
identities that are attached to me’ (p.4). Blommaert (2005) draws attention 
to the unequal distribution of the power involved in the processes of 
enacting identity, so that individuals are differentially placed to engage in 
such performances and productions, and to have their ‘identity work’ 
recognised by others – and this insight is quite compatible with the realist’s 
recognition that structured social relations, not reducible to the situated 
interactions of present social actors, shape the context of these interactions. 
The tension I see as unresolved here may be demonstrated by one 
particular kind of social category which is the focus of extensive 
sociolinguistic research, namely ‘ethnicity’. So wide is the scope of 
research concerned with the links between language and ethnic identity that 
there are not only many conferences, journals and books in which these 
topics feature as components, but there is a growing number of resources 
that are centrally concerned with this issue. (These include, for example, 
Dow 1991; Fishman 1989; Fishman 2001; Fought 2006; Haarman 1986; 
Harris and Rampton 2003). Furthermore, an on-line search readily 
generates an extensive list of recent publications that: are concerned with 
ethnicity, use ethnographic methods and fall within the domain of social 
linguistics (see, for example, Aoki 2000; Creese 2003; Heller 2003; 
McCafferty 2001; Roberts et al 2000; Schilling-Estes 2000; 2004).  
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In line with the perspective on ‘identity’ referred to above, those 
currently working in linguistic ethnography generally take ‘a “practice” 
view of ethnicity, concentrating on how ethnicities affect and get 
configured in people’s social activity together’ (Rampton, Harris and Small 
2006: 7). The study reported in this presentation pays attention to ‘race and 
ethnicity’ as ‘elements in ideologies that both pre-structure situations and 
reconstrue them afterwards,’ and that ‘reside in whichever signs, actions 
and practices reflect, invoke or produce these resources, capacities and 
ideologies’. There is an explicit rejection of theoretical orientations which 
treat ethnicity as ‘naturalised’ – although such perspectives are still around 
in sociolinguistics; (see, for example, Padilla (2001: 115) who claims that 
'[e]thnicity refers to an individual's membership in a social group that 
shares a common ancestral heritage. This ancestral heritage is 
multidimensional in nature and involves the biological, cultural, social, and 
psychological domains of life'); while other analysts have sought a 
compromise in the notion of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Bucholz 2003). 
Linguistic ethnographers Harris and Rampton (2003) align 
themselves with a ‘hybridity’ or ‘new ethnicities’ approach, which leads 
them to treat the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ 'as cultural constructs 
promoted, transgressed, defended or reworked in language, discourse and 
social activity' (p.6). These formulations imply, although the ontological 
assumptions are not necessarily explicit, that the status of ‘ethnicity’ is 
ideational, that it is a component of Popper’s World 3, a ‘denizen of the 
Cultural system’, as Archer labels ideas, once they have been voiced (1998: 
50). Again, such a perspective is quite compatible with those of realist 
commentators on this issue. But it is the implications of this perspective 
that I believe warrant further exploration. There is plenty of evidence for 
the variability both of speakers ‘ethnic’ self-identifications, and of their 
deployment of linguistic resources in relation to this. Some people, in some 
circumstances, feel strongly that they do have important ties to others on 
the basis of ethnicity; other people, in similar or perhaps quite different 
circumstances, set no such store by ethnic identification; (see, for example, 
Fenton 2003 and forthcoming). Among the former, use of a particular 
language variety (unhelpfully labelled by some writers an ‘ethnic 
language’) may be a key symbolic marker of the affiliation. But among 
others who care deeply about their ‘ethnic identity’, language may be of 
only marginal significance, if any. For example, Williams maintains that '... 
one can quite readily maintain an ethnic identity without any reference to 
fluency in the indigenous language, as is the case in Cornwall, Scottish 
Gaeldom, and Ireland' (2001: 268). Conversely, fluency in a language may 
be nowhere near enough for others to accept you as an authentic group 
member (Dow 2001).  
The ‘thick descriptions’ of ethnographic studies can demonstrate 
very thoroughly just how a ‘cultural construct’ such as ethnicity can be 
‘promoted, transgressed, defended or reworked in language, discourse and 
social activity' (Harris and Rampton 2003: 6). Yet some further interesting 
questions remain that are worth exploring: firstly, how does this conceptual 
approach accommodate – and explain - instances when ‘ethnicity’ is not 
attended to at all by speakers themselves?; and secondly, how adequate is 
this approach if we want to know more about how and why this ‘cultural 
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construct’ may come to be influential in the social world beyond the 
empirically observable ‘domain’ (Layder 1997) of situated activity?  
These questions are related to each other, because it may well be 
that an explanation as to why the ‘ethnic identity construct’ is mobilised by 
some social actors and not others, and in some circumstances and not 
others, is better explained with reference to  structured social relations, to 
the ‘domains’ of social settings and contextual resources, to those 
dimensions of social reality that are ‘… in large part constituted by 
systemic features that are relatively impersonal, inert and which represent 
the standing conditions confronting people in their everyday lives ...' 
(Layder 1998: 95).  
A number of writers are currently debating social categories, 
identity and ethnicity from a position which is sceptical of both ‘the 
prevailing constructivist stance on identity’ and the ‘essentialist claims of 
contemporary identity politics’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2002:1). These 
include Banton (1998), Brubaker (2002), Carter and Fenton (in 
preparation), Fenton (2003), Malik (2005), Ruane and Todd (2004), Todd 
(2005); (see also, on ‘race’, Carter 2000, 2007; Hirschman 2004; Webster 
1992). A key notion is the rejection of ‘ethnicity’ as causally efficacious. 
This would make problematic, for example, Rampton, Harris and Small’s 
(2006: 7) formulation referring to ‘how ethnicities affect … people’s social 
activity together’; (see, similarly, Gumperz’s formulation, ‘the effects of 
ethnic … differences’ (1982a: 210)). The key questions, according to 
writers such as Carter and Fenton, are, firstly, how ethnic or other identities 
as cultural constructs, or ideational resources, become ‘practical categories’ 
(Ruane and Todd 2004), and, secondly, how these are deployed in a system 
of power and resources. This is critical, because ‘fluid, negotiated identity-
work’ is not an adequate description of what happens when political, 
economic and legal arrangements are based on the assumption that 
ethnicity is a real phenomenon and that distinct ethnic groups and 
populations do exist. 
A final issue to raise in relation to the question of ‘which people?’ 
is the tendency of some writers to be less than fully consistent in their 
rejection of categories such as ‘ethnic group’ except as used by those they 
are studying. It is often practically adequate, at an experiential level, for 
people to manage their sense of their own ‘ethnic identity’ in ways that the 
ethnographer may observe and describe. But acceptance by researchers of 
Fenton’s point (2003: 136) that, ‘[t]he development of a unitary theory of 
"ethnicity" is a mirage,’ because ‘[o]f itself it has no precise point of 
reference, of itself it has no explanatory power,’ entails not merely 
embracing a performative, hybridised, fluid conception of the concept, but 
abandoning its use as a descriptive or analytical category. Linguistic 
ethnographers face the same challenge as other researchers if they do aim 
for consistency in this regard, as the convention of labelling social actors as 
members of supposed ethnic groups is so well established, particularly in 
the United States. Yet it is inconsistent, surely, to represent ethnicity as 
primarily a fluid and changing ideational resource, and then to refer to the 
subjects of research in terms consistent with essentialist, naturalised 
conceptions. The challenge may be illustrated with just a few examples. 
Berryhill and Linney (2006: 247) explain about their study, of ‘African 
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Americans and Latinos’ by ‘a Caucasian’, that ‘[t]he ethnography provides 
a context for the principal challenge we encountered: ensuring that the 
group had ethnic balance’. Chuang (2003: 52) takes the familiar position 
that '[c]ultural and ethnic identities are dynamic and constantly in flux’, 
and proceeds to use an unproblematised category to explain that, ‘[a] 
young African American woman may use Black vernacular when she 
speaks to her close friends who are also African American'. Reyes (2002: 
183) simultaneously asserts that her ethnographic research illustrates how 
'identity' is performatively achieved, while describing those researched as 
‘a panel of Asian American teens’. Schilling-Estes (2004: 163), similarly, 
commits herself to ‘social constructionist viewpoints’ and identity as 
‘dynamic and multifaceted’, while using the description a ‘tri-ethnic 
community’. In such discourse, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ as a social 
category has become reified (or ‘naturalised’), even while the analyst 
explicitly renounces reified concepts of identity and ethnic category 
membership. I would want to argue, with Brubaker and Cooper (2002: 5), 
that ‘we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such 
reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of 
analysis' (emphasis added), and that linguistic ethnography is sometimes 
not entirely clear or consistent in this respect. 
 
‘WHICH KINDS OF LANGUAGE?’: LINGUISTIC VARIETIES IN 
REALIST PERSPECTIVE 
As with social categories, so with linguistic varieties: how, and according 
to which theoretical precepts, does the linguistic ethnographer draw 
conclusions about language varieties and patterned variation in their use by 
those s/he studies? 
As linguistic ethnographers explain (see Rampton, this issue), 
empirical research into language behaviour which is influenced by the 
assumptions of traditional linguistics may be rather too ready to generalise 
about language structure. Rampton et al (2004: 4 – 5), citing Volosinov, 
contrast the ‘objectivism’ of ‘positivist’, ‘structuralist’ linguistics with ‘the 
“linguistic” or “discursive” turn in the humanities and social sciences’ 
associated with post-structuralism. Relativist knowledge claims are 
preferred, and are linked with democratic, emancipatory politics. Indeed, 
Hymes (1996) explicitly envisions ethnography in such terms, emphasising 
the ‘intricacy and subtlety of any normal person’s knowledge of language’ 
(p. 14), in the context of there being ‘… no reason to think professional 
ethnographers privileged,’ (a claim which contrasts with that he makes 
about social actors’ ‘articulated models’ of their community – see above). 
So on what grounds, if any, are linguistic ethnographers privileged in their 
understandings of linguistic matters? 
For speakers themselves, the immediate benefits and drawbacks of 
different kinds of language use are likely to be practically apparent, as are 
the traditional labels for language varieties, and many popular judgements 
about accents, ‘correctness’, the desirability of learning English and so on. 
‘Lay’ or ‘folk’ ideas about languages are at odds both with more 
traditional, structuralist linguistics and with more ‘post-modern’, 
‘discursive’ conceptualizations of language. Pennycook (2006: 66) 
positions mainstream language research alongside commonsense notions 
 10 
when he maintains that, ‘[t]he idea that languages somehow exist as 
ontological entities, with their attendant structures, boundaries, grammars, 
and forms, has become an almost unquestioned given of both academic 
thought and more popular discourse on language.’ From his ‘postmodern’ 
perspective, he concludes that ‘… we no longer need to maintain the 
pernicious myth that languages exist’ (2006: 67). Klein (1998) makes a 
similar claim, maintaining that for both Saussure and Chomsky the notion 
of ‘a language’ abstracts away from empirically observed variation, so that 
‘under both views, the object of investigation is an ideal entity’ (p.540). 
Klein continues, ‘The normal case is that every person has varying 
knowledge of different languages: That is a good way to state the facts for 
the layman who believes that there are well-defined entities called 
“languages.” But there aren’t; a “real language” is a normative fiction’ 
(Klein 1998: 541, italics in original). In some way or another, linguistic 
ethnographers may well encounter ‘folk’ beliefs about language among 
those they study that are strikingly at odds with the post-structuralism of 
their theoretical inclinations (Rampton, this issue). 
As an alternative, as I have suggested elsewhere (Carter and Sealey 
2000; Sealey and Carter 2004), there is promise in the recognition of a 
stratified ontology which would allow for analytical distinctions to be 
drawn between the claims made about language as these relate to different 
domains of reality. We can distinguish between competing accounts and 
descriptions in part by recognizing that they are accounts of different kinds 
of things. Furthermore, these accounts are not merely the products of 
discourse, but are attempts to describe phenomena that do exist 
independently of our descriptions of them. 
At an experiential level, speakers – and this includes linguists as 
well as other ‘folk’ – will, when we travel or in certain other situations, 
find ourselves failing to understand, or to be understood, as those around us 
communicate in a variety that is not in our own repertoire. Non-linguists 
(Klein’s ‘laymen’) may conceptualize this experience with reference to 
‘well-defined entities called “languages,”’ and are understandably likely to 
be resistant to suggestions that they are mistaken – for surely in one sense 
they are not. Empirical experience, in situated interactions, leads to a not 
unreasonable perception that different people speak different languages, or 
different variants of the same language. Long and Preston (2002a: xxi) 
maintain that it is research into the nature of these perceptions (perceptual 
dialectology) that provides one of the answers, perhaps the only answer, ‘to 
the age-old question of where one language stops and another starts’. 
Linguistic ethnography is by no means the only approach used in 
exploring this level of linguistic reality (see Preston 1999 and Long and 
Preston 2002 for examples of a number of methods), but it can bring an 
additional range of insights to bear. From participants’ language choices in 
specific contexts, researchers can learn which contrasts are seen by them as 
salient and which trivial, a potential that is forcefully summarised by 
Blommaert (2003: 615): ‘Ethnography will allow us to unravel the details 
of how language varieties and discourses work for people, what they 
accomplish (or fail to) in practice, and how this fits into local economies of 
resources.’ Knowledge and understanding of some aspects of language 
practices are available most effectively – perhaps exclusively – by 
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ethnographic work among those who experience them. In particular, it is 
linguistic ethnographies that have demonstrated how variation in speakers’ 
detailed paralinguistic and prosodic practices and expectations can lead to 
miscommunication (e.g. Bremer et al 1996; Gumperz 1982a, 1982b; 
Roberts, Davies and Jupp 1992; Roberts and Sarangi 1999). These subtle 
cues are routinely experienced, but ‘are rarely talked about and tend to be 
noticed only when things go wrong’ (Gumperz 1982a: 162); they are ‘not 
readily subject to conscious recall’ (Gumperz 1982a: 204); nor, we might 
add, do language users deploy the same terms and concepts to describe 
these phenomena as language analysts do. Thus empirical data, generated 
in situated interaction, can be analysed using the tools of linguistic 
ethnography. These help to explain the experiences of speakers who 
themselves perceive the linguistic variations in rather different ways.  
Arguably, part of this difference is attributable to the distinction 
between what Bhaskar identifies as the ‘empirical’, the ‘actual’ and the 
‘real’. This distinction allows for the recognition of language as a universal 
human capacity inaccessible to direct empirical observation, an emergent, 
cultural product of the interaction between human beings and the material 
world3. Sayer (2000: 12) explains that, '[w]hereas the real ... refers to the 
structures and powers of objects, the actual refers to what happens if and 
when those powers are activated'. Language ‘varieties’, then, may be 
considered artefacts, with, as Coulmas (2005: 4) puts it, 'physical, mental 
and technical aspects. … Every language could be different from what it 
actually is. ... The existence of different languages is a historical fact, a 
result of language change, a result of choice'. Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 
(2003: 25) provide a summary of the distinction: 'Though languages and 
other semiotic structures / systems are dependent on actors for their 
reproduction, they always already pre-exist any given actor (or subset of 
actors), and have a relative autonomy from them as real objects, even when 
not actualised' (emphasis added). 
This stratified approach can also accommodate both the empirically 
perceived experience of ‘speaking the same language’ – or of failing to 
understand and make oneself understood – as well as the actualized 
phenomena identified in studies such as those by Gumperz and others, with 
their access to concepts such as prosodic variation and so on. It also helps 
to explain the second order of emergence that institutionalizes (or 
‘artefactualizes’ (Blommaert 2006)) language boundaries; these are the 
processes associated with the introduction of writing systems, formal 
education and political priorities – referred to by Coulmas (2005: 7) as ‘a 
language regime … a set of constraints on individual language choices'. 
Methodologically, ethnography is ideally suited to illuminating particular 
kinds of language realities, but other methods may be better equipped to 
explore others.  
From the language description perspective, some hitherto 
unobserved properties of language can be seen differently now that 
researchers can observe patterns which emerge only when linguistic 
products are viewed in very large quantities, in the form of a corpus, and 
with specially developed software. This research reveals how ‘what is 
frequently said’ can become a constraint on what, ‘although we are in 
principle free to say whatever we want,’ subsequent speakers can say 
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(Stubbs 2001: 19; see also Louw 1993). These constraints are not simply a 
matter of scale: emergence concerns irreducibility, and some of the 
emergent properties of language are only apparent when the perspective is 
shifted away from the immediate context of production. 
From the social description perspective, the properties and powers 
of the social structures that are implicated in the physical, economic, 
cultural and political inequalities which intersect with language practices in 
all sorts of ways are also less accessible to the kinds of direct observation 
that linguistic ethnography typically involves. This leads to the final 
section of my ‘generic question’, about the contexts in which people use 
language to varying effects. 
 
‘IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WITH WHAT OUTCOMES?’: 
CONSTRAINTS AND ENABLEMENTS 
The final component of the generic question I am addressing in this paper 
acknowledges that language use, and the cumulative effects of individuals 
and groups deploying linguistic resources, are context specific. Champions 
of the ethnographic method celebrate its potential for holistically 
encompassing the detailed specifics of times, places, settings and 
relationships in which speakers act. Critics query what the point may be of 
descriptions that are so specific there can be no general conclusions drawn. 
A potential resolution arises from consideration of the properties and 
powers of the constituents of the social world, where distinctions are drawn 
between these different kinds of things. Let us explore this issue with 
reference to another specific example. 
The English acquired by urban Africans may offer them 
considerable prestige and access to middle-class identities in 
African towns. It may be an ‘expensive’ resource to them. But the 
same variety of English, when spoken in London by the same 
Africans, may be a crucial object of stigmatization and may qualify 
them as members of the lower strata of society  
(Blommaert 2003: 616). 
 
Our knowledge of these speakers’ experiences may well be acquired best 
through the kinds of ethnographic methods under discussion. It will 
certainly not be generated in an experimental setting, or via introspection. 
What, though, is it knowledge of? One interpretation – recognisable no 
doubt to teachers, politicians or employers – is that this is best understood 
by identifying the features of this ‘African English’ and comparing them 
with standard British or American English. An alternative interpretation 
would focus on ‘urban Africans’ with ‘middle-class identities’ as the social 
group in question, and would seek an explanation through thick 
descriptions of the situated interactions between these speakers and those 
they encounter in London. More productive, though, I would suggest, is a 
recognition that the operative mechanism is not to be found at either of 
these levels of reality. 
What these speakers encounter is structured by existing institutional 
arrangements, which can act as constraints or enablements in respect of the 
projects they pursue. Recognition of the likely advantages has led many 
speakers, of many empirically distinct varieties, to invest resources in 
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acquiring an additional language variety. (Most obviously and most 
recently the disproportionately ‘targeted’ variety has been English, but 
other varieties have had a similar appeal at other times, albeit not on such a 
scale.) At an individual level, the resources invested may be experienced as 
emotional as well as financial, and the concept of ‘cultural capital’ 
(Bourdieu) is well established. In addition, the relatively new field of 
‘language economics’ (Grin 2006) is concerned with the literal costs of 
such an enterprise. What is the financial outlay (for an individual or a 
polity) of learning (or providing schooling in) an additional variety? How 
do inequalities of earnings correlate with linguistic variation? How do 
changes in the relative ‘dominance’ of varieties modify the costs for which 
subsequent learners will be liable? And how do such changes modify the 
costs of not learning a variety? As Graddol (2006: 38) puts it, ‘English is 
widely regarded as a gateway to wealth for national economies, 
organisations, and individuals. If that is correct, the distribution of poverty 
in future will be closely linked to the distributions of English.’ 
These factors operate at a level of social structure that is neither 
empirically observable (except indirectly, through the collection of 
statistics, for example, which themselves rely on dense networks of 
theoretical assumptions), nor reducible to the wishes or actions of those 
experiencing their effects. Constraints and enablements ‘… are transmitted 
to us by shaping the situations (structural or cultural) in which we find 
ourselves, such that some courses of action would be impeded and others 
would be facilitated’ (Archer 1995: 4). They are, however, neither context-
neutral nor invariant. The same linguistic resources, in the repertoire of the 
same individual, may be associated with different kinds of outcome in 
different settings, as the example of African migrants demonstrates; the 
‘cultural capital’ associated with the ability to speak English can diminish 
over time (see below). In other words, what was an enablement in one 
social setting becomes a constraint in another. In this sense, the decision to 
learn English – or not to do so – is likely to carry objective consequences, 
irrespective of actors’ interpretations of these. As analysts, we can if we 
choose reject the evaluation of access to British citizenship or to the labour 
market as necessarily ‘beneficial’, but we cannot deny that current 
configurations of structured social relations deny such opportunities to 
some while offering them to others. I agree with Blommaert’s claim (2003: 
615) that ethnography ‘allows us to check, at the lowest level, how larger 
patterns and developments are set down in the actual realities of language 
usage,’ but I am not so sure that the issue is merely one of scale. He 
continues, ‘We obviously need studies of the different levels and scales – 
studies of linguistic variation, of history and policy – but it would be a 
fallacy to regard ethnography merely as “the study of small things”. It is an 
indispensable ingredient of a toolkit for the study of big things.’ This claim 
too is unexceptionable, in my opinion, but equally indispensable is a 
methodological means of accessing and interpreting the structural realities 
involved in the experiential realities of these speakers. To extend 
Blommaert’s analogy, linguistic ethnography could benefit from being 
more explicit about the characteristics of the other ‘ingredients in the 
toolkit’, and about how exactly various tools of analysis are differentially 
selected and deployed in complementary ways. Realist theorists such as 
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Archer (1995; 1996) have drawn attention to the different timescales 
relevant to understanding the social world. Likewise, Blommaert (2005: 
127-8) cites Braudel’s insight about ‘the slow patterns of history’ being 
‘beyond the grasp of subjects-in-history’, a recognition which would seem 
to render the empirical methods of ethnography not particularly well suited 
to the identification or analysis of the social structures which constrain and 
enable the actions of present agents, since these '… are the effects of past 
actions, often by long dead people' (Archer 1995:148). This is not to deny 
that the effects of such forces on contemporary ‘subjects-in-history’ may 
well be explored ethnographically. Nevertheless, as Layder (2005: 108) 
puts it, ‘… to reduce power, institutions, organisations and the distribution 
of various resources to local practices is to confuse and conflate very 
different kinds of social phenomena.’ The distinctive properties of social 
structures include their ‘anteriority’: that is, they pre-exist the people 
whose activities are constrained or enabled by the organisations, 
institutions and cultural products which provide the contexts for their 
actions; they also, as has been noted, endure and develop on a timescale 
different from that of the individual lifespan. Moreover, while they are 
undeniably products of human actions and intentions, social structures 
cannot be easily modified, nor are they readily apparent, at the level of 
everyday experience; nor can we know (except within a very circumscribed 
ambit) what the effects of our actions on them will be.  
The realists who have developed most helpfully the analytical 
dualism of the structure-agency relation also emphasise the importance of 
emergence, glossed in these terms by Benton and Craib (2001 :180): 
When elements are combined together into more complex entities, 
the latter often have properties which are qualitatively distinct from 
those of the original elements. This is known as ‘emergence’, and 
the properties which ‘emerge’ in this way are ‘emergent properties’, 
or powers – a new level of organization. 
 
Like contrasting language varieties, some of the effects of the growth in 
demand for English documented by Graddol (2006) are ‘emergent’ in this 
sense. To give one brief example, there is a rapidly diminishing amount of 
‘cultural capital’ accruing to native speakers: ‘As English becomes 
entrenched as a lingua franca, the cost of learning it for non-native speakers 
lowers and the benefits of acquiring it rise. In much of the world, learning 
English becomes easier and the benefits it brings rise, as more of the world 
speaks it’ (p.122). Every one of the individuals whose knowledge of 
English features in the billions counted makes a contribution to the global 
context in which, for example, Blommaert’s African migrants experience 
their use of the language. But the changing nature of that context is not 
reducible to the cumulative effect of individuals’ choices and actions. A 
similar point is made by Archer (2000: 467), who identifies as ‘third order 
effects’ ‘the academic privileges which today’s native English speaking 
academics enjoy’. These, she maintains, ‘cannot be explained as other than 
the unintended resultant of these powers [mass production, the Industrial 
Revolution and the resultant wealth generating powers of Britain], 
exercised seriatim, but irreducible to the individual people involved’ 
(original emphasis).  
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(Linguistic) ethnography, then, can reveal in detail how speakers 
negotiate the constraints and enablements attendant on their particular 
situated experience, but it cannot account for the pre-existing structural 
properties and powers which are experienced as constraints and 
enablements by these social actors: different kinds of research methods are 
needed to explore this dimension of social reality. As Archer (2000: 469) 
notes, ‘Matters of ontology are not settled by interviewing people about 
them!’ – nor, we might add, are they likely to be settled by participant 




As Rampton (this issue) illustrates, linguistic ethnography in the UK has 
benefited from its multidisciplinary provenance, and it is clearly providing 
important insights into a range of social and discursive practices. The 
contribution that I would hope to make to this enterprise is in encouraging 
its practitioners to engage with sociological realism. It is not 
methodologically prescriptive, and can readily accommodate those 
explorations of the domain of situated activity which ethnography can so 
aptly accomplish. Rather than succumbing to ‘impatience with analyses 
devoted to structural systems’ (Rampton, this issue), ethnographers might 
perhaps welcome such analyses as complementary to their own. Future 
collaboration could then include more precise identification of the 
ontological assumptions underpinning LE research, and the implications of 
these. It could also facilitate explorations of how the differential properties 
and powers of language, structure and agency help to explain which kinds 
of people come to use which kinds of language in what circumstances and 




1  I am grateful to the UK Linguistic Ethnography Forum for inviting 
me to contribute to the colloquium at the annual meeting of the 
British Association for Applied Linguistics in 2005 where this 
paper originated. I should also like to acknowledge the comments 
on an earlier draft by three anonymous referees and the guest 
editors of the journal, as well as correspondence with Martyn 
Hammersley and discussion with Bob Carter. 
2 Realism’s detractors often seem to misunderstand its implications, 
as Sayer notes in his introduction to Realism and Social Science 
(2000: 2): 'I am aware that in certain quarters, "realism" is 
synonymous with a form of naive objectivism, claiming unmediated 
access to the Truth. This misconception prevents realism getting a 
hearing. At the same time, I am also wary of naive supporters of 
realism who assume that it will indeed guarantee the production of 
true knowledge, when the independence of the world and the 
entrapment of knowledge within discourse imply the impossibility 
of any such guarantees.' 
3 Note that this kind of claim about the unobservable properties of 
language does not entail convergence with the Chomskyan 
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tradition, and it is quite possible to accept that some properties of 
language are not empirically available to us without accepting that 
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